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CONTRACTS-1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
MERTON L FERSON*
Mutual Assents: In the case of Jones v. Horner it appeared that
Jones was a tenant of Mrs. Homer. The lease gave Jones an op-
tion to purchase the property for a stated price and provided that
Jones might exercise his option "by payment or tender of the agreed
purchase price." Jones, within the life of the option, without tender-
ing the purchase price, gave notice that he would exercise the option.
He said he would pay the purchase price upon receipt of a deed to
the property. Mrs. Homer refused to treat this notice as a valid
exercise of the option.
Judge Swepston sustained the chancellor who had held in the trial
court that Mrs. Homer was not bound. He points out that an option
is an irrevocable offer and, like any other offer, must be accepted in
accordance with its terms in order to make a contract. The terms of
this option called for payment-not merely a promise to pay. The
Judge points out that the rule of substantial compliance is not ap-
plicable to the exercise of an option.
In the case of Anderson v. Sharp2 the following facts appeared.
Alyne Dumas Lee is a professional singer. She had been engaged to
give a concert at the Shiloh Presbyterian Church in Knoxville for a
consideration of $200.00. The agreement was that she was to be paid
before she sang. When it was time to start, only $117.00 had been taken
in for sold admissions. In this situation Sharp and Scott, who were
known agents to known principals, signed an agreement with Miss
Lee that read in part as follows: "We the undersigned agree to pay
to Alyne Dumas Lee the sum of $200.00 for Artistic Services to be
rendered on May 26, 1949, at the Shiloh Presbyterian Church, Knox-
ville, Tenn....
"It is further understood and agreed that this programme is under
the auspices of Usher Board of the Shiloh Presbyterian Church, and
Clinton Chapel Sunday School (Clinton Chapel A.M.E. Zion Church).
"Signed Stella H. Sharp
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Dean Emeritus, University of
Cincinnati College of Law; author, The Rational Basis of Contracts (1949).
1. 260 S.W.2d 198 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
2. 259 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1953).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
"Signed S. S. Scott
"Signed Alyne Dumas Lee"
Miss Lee was paid the $117.00. In this case she sues Sharp and Scott
as individuals on the theory that they individually promised to pay
the balance of $83.00.
The court was of the opinion that the instrument sued on was
ambiguous as to what parties were bound and that parol evidence was
admissible to explain the actual agreement. On the oral evidence the
court found that Miss Lee was not expecting Scott and Sharp to pay
the bill but that she was expecting it to be paid by their disclosed
principals.
When an agent makes a contract there is frequently presented a
peculiar question of interpretation. Has the agent bound himself? Has
he bound his principal? Or has he bound both himself and his prin-
cipal? When an agent makes an informal contract for a known prin-
cipal it is presumed that the contract is binding on the principal3 but
not on the agent.4 But when an agent makes a contract that in terms
binds the agent he cannot avoid being held personally on the contract
by showing his agency. And that is so whether his principal is dis-
closed or undisclosed.
The contract in this case of Anderson v. Sharp recites "We the
undersigned agree ... ." And the contract is signed by agents Sharp
and Scott. This sounds like the agents, Sharp and Scott, were making
themselves liable. But the court notes that Miss Lee also signed the
contract and that she would not be promising to pay herself. The
court also notes that the contract recites that the programme is to be
given under the auspices of two organizations (the principals). It
is hard to demonstrate that one or another construction of a contract
is correct. But the features alluded to seem to warrant the court in
its finding that this contract was ambiguous.
Liability of Consignee Who Accepts Shipment: A consignee who
has made no promise to the shipper or carrier cannot be made liable
for freight charges by a shipment to him. But if a consignee accepts
a shipment the law is quick to imply a promise on his part to pay the
freight charges. In Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Cumberland Storage &
3. Rochell v. Moore-Handley Hardware Co., 239 Ala. 555, 196 So. 143 (1940).
See also RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 146, 147 (1933).
4. Owen v. Gooch, 2 Esp. 567 (1797). See also, Warren v. Dickson, 27 Ill.
115 (1862); Beeman v. May, 193 Misc. 684, 85 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1948); Right
Printing Co. v. Stevens, 107 Vt. 359, 179 Atl. 209, 100 A.L.R. 528 (1935).
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Warehouse Co.,5 the carrier brought suit on a demurrage charge.
Several cars of scrap iron had been shipped to the defendants who
were engaged in the storage and warehouse business in Nashville.
The defendants were to unload the cars and reload the scrap iron
onto barges, rendering such service for the owners of the scrap iron.
When the cars in question arrived no barge was available. The carrier
asked an officer of the defendant what to do with the cars. He replied,
"I don't know, I don't want them, we have no place to put them, we
don't want the scrap." After some delay, however, a barge arrived
and the defendant received the cars. The court held that the de-
fendants were liable for the demurrage charges. The decision can
probably be justified on general principles. A consignee of goods is
presumed to be their owner and when he exercises domiiiion over the
goods by accepting delivery he impliedly promises to pay the freight.
6
The decision is bolstered by the fact that there was an "average
demurrage agreement" between the plaintiff and the defendant
whereby the defendant promised to pay" demurrage charges.
The decision in Plastic Products Co. v. Cook Truck Lines is hard on
the consignee. Goods were shipped from Pittman, N. J., to the de-
fendant, Plastic Products Co., in Memphis. Shipment was C.O.D. by
truck line. The initial carrier brought the goods to Nashville where
they were picked up by the Cook Truck Lines and by them delivered
to the defendant. The initial carrier erroneously changed the bill
of lading from "C.O.D." to "prepaid." Thus the defendant in Memphis
received the goods on a "prepaid" freight bill. The defendant used
some of the goods received and rejected the rest. A settlement was
made with regard to the rejected goods on the erroneous assumption
that the freight had been paid. This would seem to lay the grounds
on which the defendants could set up an estoppel. But it was admitted
by the plaintiff that "An interstate carrier cannot by any action estop
itself from exacting the lawful freight rate and recovering the full
amount from the consignee or consignor." The moral seems to be
that consignees should be chary about accepting interstate shipments
that they are not bound to receive.
Contract in Favor of Third Party: The case of Stewart v. Sullivan
County8 involves a point that was not fully discussed in Judge Gailof's
opinion. The suit was brought by a number of property owners in
5. 260 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
6. New York Cent. R.R. v. Ross Lumber Co., 234 N. Y. 261, 137 N.E. 324
(1922).
7. 260 S.W.2d 178 (Tenn. 1953).
8. 264 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. 1953).
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Sullivan County' against the County and the Tennessee Valley
'Authority. It was based on a contract between Sullivan County and
the TVA. The contractors took for granted a possibility that the
TVA might, in its operations, inundate or otherwise obstruct highways
and bridges that the county was obliged to maintain. The contract
provided in part as follows: "The Authority hereby expressly cove-
nants and agrees to indemnify the County against and save it harmless
from any such obligation or liability." The contract further provides
that the county shall not settle claims without the consent of the
Authority, and that the Authority shall have full control over the
defense and settlement of claims.
The right of the plaintiffs, property owners, to recover directly
against the TVA is the point in question. The court says, correctly of
course, that "it is elementary law in Tennessee that the beneficiary
of a contract made by third parties may sue in his own right for its
breach." It will be observed that the undertaking of the TVA runs
only to Sullivan County. The Authority did not in terms consent to
be bound to property owners or to anyone except the County. Should
the property owners have a right of action, on that contract, directly
against the TVA? The court held that the property owners did have
such a right of action.
A similar question has arisen in connection with automobile liability
,insurance. In Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Beckwithvl it appeared that
a policy of liability insurance had been taken out by the owner of
an automobile. In terms the company's promise ran only to the
insured. But the victim of an accident was allowed to recover from
the insurance company. The Beckwith case was similar to the Sullivan
County case in this: it provided that the insured could not settle any
claim or interfere in any negotiation about claims without the consent
of the company.
Statutes exist in a good many states that give an injured or damaged
person a right of action directly against the insurer in respect to
insurance that was carried by the party who was primarily liable.'0
The Sullivan County case and the Beckwith case indicate a tendency
to hold the insured liable to the victim even without the aid of a
statute. If a theory is needed to support this tendency it can be found
in the subrogation or asset theory that was long used to enable a
creditor beneficiary to recover on a contract that had been made in his
favor. The subrogation theory as applied to the Sullivan County case
would run like this. The landowners can recover against the county.
9. 74 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1935).
10. See Note collecting many cases, 85 A.L.R. 20 (1933).
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The county has a right against TVA to be indemnified. This right is
an asset of the county. The property owners could reach it by first
getting a judgment against the county and then garnishing TVA. Why
relegate the property owners to such a roundabout procedure? Let
their recovery be direct.
On grounds of justice and expediency, the decisions in the Beckwith
and Sullivan County cases are satisfactory. As stated in a note in the
Michigan Law Review "This result seems desirable. It is welcomed
with enthusiasm by the person injured, and it is agreeable to the
insured because it relieves him of the worries of collecting from his
obligor; finally, the insurer ought not to complain because he owes the
debt anyway and it should make no difference to whom he pays it.""
Breach: The case of King v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York 2
grew out of the alleged failure of an insurance company to pay disa-
bility benefits due under a policy. The plaintiff presented his case in
four counts. They will be noted seriatim.
In the first count the plaintiff invoked a Tennessee statute and
sued to recover the accrued monthly benefits, plus interest, plus the
statutory penalty of 25% and plus the amount of premiums paid since
commencement of disability. The plaintiff was allowed to recover
on this count.
In the second count the plaintiff asked for a decree of specific per-
formance, requiring the defendant to pay future installments as they
became due and enjoining the defendant from requiring physical
examinations outside his home county and from requiring any ex-
amination oftener than once a year. This count was stricken out on
the ground that it asked the court to remake the contract by which
the parties would be governed in the future. This seems to be a
natural disposal of the second count.
The plaintiff's third count alleges a breach of the whole policy and
a repudiation by the defendant of its duties under the policy. Where-
fore, the plaintiff sues to recover the present value of all future
benefits, including the death benefit and the monthly payments, based
upon the life expectancy of the insured. It is obvious that the plaintiff,
if allowed to, recover according to his claim in the third count, would
get judgment for an amount that is relatively large as compared with
recovery of the past due payments, even after the addition of the 25%
11. 33 M1cH. L. REv. 1263 (1935).
12. 114 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
13. TENx. CODE ANN. § 6086 (Williams 1934).
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penalty. This third count was stricken out. The decision on this point
is in line with what is probably the better view. But there is some
authority to the contrary.
14
The company broke its contract when it defaulted on even one
payment. But there is a difference between (a) a partial breach, in
which case the plaintiff can recover only damages for the omission
that has occurred; and (b) a total breach, in which case the plaintiff
can cash in on the whole contract, including the payments that are
not yet due. Does this third count present a case of total breach and
so enable the plaintiff to get one remedial right in lieu of the entire
contract?
Perhaps a digression is in order to notice that instances of total
breach are frequent in connection with bilateral contracts but are
rare in connection with unilateral contracts.
Almost all bilateral contracts are for an "agreed exchange."'6 The
gist of the bargain is that the performance on one side is to be ren-
dered in exchange for the performance on the other side. And that
is true even though one or both performances are, by the terms of
the contract, to extend over a period of time. Suppose, for example,
that A is building a house for B under a contract that calls for pay-
ments by B at intervals as the work progresses. That would be a
contract for an agreed exchange. Suppose further that B materially
fails to keep up his payments. What can A do? He can, in the alterna-
tive, sue for the payments that are due-i. e., he can sue for the par-
tial breach that has occurred. Or A can stop work and sue for the
profit he would have made on the entire contract-i.e., he can sue for
a total breach. In case B not only fails to make his payments but also
repudiates the contract A must desist from further performance under
this penalty: he cannot recover any enhanced damages that are
caused by his continuance. And so A, in such a case as we have sup-
posed, may or must sue as for a total breach.
Consider next the matter of breach of a unilateral contract. In such
a contract one party has already performed. The bargain does not
contemplate a future exchange. The party who has performed simply
has a right to get the price of his performance which has already been
rendered. He has no alternative right to get damages because the
exchange will not go through.16 It has gone through to the extent
14. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, 12 F.2d 693 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 273
U.S. 722, (1926).
15. The exceptions are noted in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 266 (1932).
16. Exceptions are noted in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 316 (1932).
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that his performance has been rendered. Suppose, for instance, that
A Bank has loaned B $1,200.00. It is to be repaid in monthly install-
ments of $100.00. Suppose further that B materially defaults in making
payments, and even repudiates, what can the bank do? In the absence
of an acceleration clause in B's promise, the bank cannot do a thing
except bide its time and sue for installments as they come due.
Against this background we may consider the King case. According
to count three, the insurance company defaulted in that it failed to
make payments of monthly benefits that were due. It is asserted also
that the company repudiated its liability. Does the company's be-
havior constitute a total breach and enable the insured to cash in on
the whole contract? That is, does it enable the insured to recover
the present worth of payments that are expected to fall due under
the policy? The case of Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe1'7 presented
facts that were substantially like the facts in the King case. It was
there held, by a divided court, that the plaintiff could recover the
present worth of all payments that would become due under the policy
according to the life expectancy of the insured. Judge Donahue, in
writing the majority opinion, took the view that the contract was not
unilateral, inasmuch as the insured had to be examined periodically
and make reports. The decision in the Rascoe case has been expressly
disapproved by the Supreme Court of the United States.1 8 The ex-
press disapproval of this high Court might, however, be considered
dicta because in the cases where the expressions were made it did not
appear that there had been flat repudiations by the company. Said
Professor Williston,' 9 in speaking of this group of cases, "It can hardly
be doubted that few courts will hereafter allow recovery of future
instalments of an insurance policy or of any other instalment contract
where the consideration has been fully paid, and where all that re-
mains to be performed is a series of fixed payments."
This extended discussion of the plaintiff's third count in the King
case leads to the conclusion that Judge Taylor was right in striking
out that count. The apology for the extended discussion of Judge
Taylor's brief opinion is that there has been enough difference of
judicial authority on the point to justify a re-examination of the basic
principles that are involved.
The plaintiff, in his fourth count sought to rescind the entire con-
17. Supra note 14.
18. Mobley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 295 U.S. 632, 55 Sup. Ct. 876, 79 L. Ed.
1621 (1935); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 56 Sup. Ct. 615 80
L. Ed. 971 (1936).
19. 23 A.B.A.J. 172, 177 (1937).
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tract and to recover all the premiums he had paid. This count also
was stricken. In addition to the reasons given by Judge Taylor, it
may be noted that rescission and restitution is not an available remedy
unless there has been a total breach.20 Another reason for denying
the plaintiff's claim for restitution is that it would be impossible for
him to return the benefits he had received in the way of protection
during the time the policy was in effect.
20. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 347 (1932).
